

MEMO ROUTING SLIP		NEVER USE FOR APPROVALS, DISAPPROVALS, CONCURRENCES, OR SIMILAR ACTIONS		ACTION	
1 TO	(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36 P2	INITIALS	CIRCULATE		
		DATE	COORDINATION		
2	Pls. call [redacted]		FILE		
			INFORMATION		
3	x4480 S		NOTE AND RETURN		
			PER CON- VERSATION		
4			SEE ME		
			SIGNATURE		
REMARKS <p>Owen:</p> <p>Would appreciate your comments on the attached final draft. We are asking for ADP concurrence so that we can sit with the Ad Hod Group about Wednesday of this week. The sections dealing with emergency destruction and enduring detention are new, but appear to be acceptable.</p> <p>(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36</p>					
FROM		DATE			
D321		25 Aug 69			
		PHONE			
		5825s			

DD FORM 1 OCT 60 95

REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITION

☆ GPO: 1968-O-312-139

Approved for Release by NSA on 07-08-2013, FOIA Case # 63391

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

26 August 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD TO []

SUBJECT: Draft Report of USIB AdHoc Group on PUEBLO

1. Attached draft is report of USIB AdHoc Group from the SIGINT and Security Sub-Committee of USIB. [] and Len Bienvenu are the NSA reps. This is the companion report to the Navy Report read earlier this week and IIR discussed with you.

2. My general impression of the report is that the Special AdHoc Group did little more than take the Recommendations of the AIM Showers IDAG and reword them in directive language for attachment to DCID 6/3. It would appear very little review of actual practices did take place.

3. There are some serious problems/interpretations involved which should be brought to your attention:

PAGE 2, PARA 4

The AdHoc Group, for some reason, limited their consideration to COMINT. The IDAG charge was for all Special Intelligence. COMINT was not the only "culprit" that needed tightening up on the PUEBLO. I think the group moved toward COMINT since it is specifically covered in directives and rather well understood. If they took on all Special Intelligence, they would have to do some original research (my personal opinion). I think a comment on why just "COMINT" is necessary in the paper.

PAGE 2, PARA (b) of the

DRAFT Policy statement "by message" should not be specified. Some of original inventories to NSA will be thousands of items. If left open, NSA can then set up procedure as done for ships and get lists by mail. Requirement for quarterly inventory statement will require increased manpower to handle at least on initial inputs. Quarterly requirement should eventually work down to only "changes" to basic inventory being forwarded.

PAGE 2, PARA d.

P2 raised some objection to annual inspection, but I feel this is OK since this is part of regular military IG inspection procedure that just needs increased emphasis, not large expenditure of new resources.

PAGE 3

"Levying of Requirements" -- Remove (a) (b) (c); (a) is statement of problem; (b) is rationale for change and (c) is the change required. In (c) renumber (1) and (2) to (a) and (b).

~~APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN
CODEWORD MATERIAL~~

~~DOWNGRADE TO *Secret*
WHEN INCLOSURE(S) ARE REMOVED~~

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In first para (a) "unmodified" should be deleted and (SICR's) added after intelligence requirements; this is specific problems identified. Also, in same sentence delete "useful" since it is not a useful practice and leave it as a potentially dangerous practice.

PAGE 5, PARA (g)

Disagree with inference in second sentence that when SIGINT operational control is delegated that some portions of technical control, such as risk to intelligence sources and documents, are also delegated to field commander. I do not feel that the field commander can weigh his intelligence advantage against loss of TOP SECRET information, for example, without having advantage of NSA judgement. Consultation with NSA when SIGINT sources, methods, and documents are endangered should be mandatory.

PAGE 6, PARA (d)

Priority destruction of documents should conform to classification, i.e., TOP SECRET first etc.

[REDACTED]
EXEC/P34

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

Incl:
a/s

~~TOP SECRET~~